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FOREWORD

VALUES IN EDUCATION: SPECULATIONS ON THE
ROLE OF THE STATE, SCHOOLS AND FAMILIES
DOUGLAS

W.

KMIEC*

This issue continues a previous discussion in this Journal
which posed the question of whether parents or the state
should have the primary role in educating children.' There,
the supporters of the state argued that a tolerance of divergent views could only be successfully accomplished in the
public school.' The voices championing greater parental authority, on the other hand, stressed individual liberty and
free choice.$ Since both tolerance and liberty are values to be
cherished, and necessarily difficult to rank order, the discussion yielded something of an intellectual stalemate.
In a particularly rich article,4 Professor Tyll van Geel
moves beneath the previous stalemate to suggest that the tolerance of the public school is actually part of a concerted effort at inculcation or indoctrination in accepted social beliefs.
To his dismay, such inculcation frequently dwarfs the occasional, and what he calls "subversive" impulse, to teach in a
manner which encourages critical and independent thought.
In this manner, the tolerance heralded as the public
school's strength is seen by Professor van Geel as highly limited, or at least, less valuable. Ideas contrary to the " 'correct'
version of historical events" or "radical political and economic beliefs" are either excluded from or diluted in the
* Professor of Law and Director, Thos. J. White Center on Law &
Government, University of Notre Dame.
1. Symposium on Education, 1 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
(1985).
2. See generally Gutmann, Democratic Schools and Moral Education, 1
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 461 (1985).
3. See generally Coons, Intellectual Liberty and the Schools, 1 NOTRE
DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 495 (1985).

4.

van Geel, The Prisoner's Dilemma and Education Policy, 3 NOTRE

DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 301 (1988).
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public classroom. At best, a student is told: understand divergent views well enough to know that you should not embrace
or follow them. In short, says van Geel, public education in
America is "a tradition that seeks social control and social
ends through inculcation of the young."' In the language of
recent Senate hearings over judicial nominees, it is a process
designed to produce thinkers who are not "out of the
mainstream."
Now for many, past and present, education in the basic
principles of American society, be it tolerance or other forms
of republican virtue, would be an unquestioned "public
good." It was through this process that diverse ethnic groups
were "Americanized," and it is by the same approach that
current racial, religious and ethnic tensions are lessened. Van
Geel recognizes these inculcative features of education as a
public good. Nevertheless, he is deeply disturbed by the loss
of freedom entailed when students are not "let in" on subversive views.
Van Geel attempts to strengthen his argument for deliberately incorporating material subversive to mainstream
thought by suggesting that, if it is not done, parents and students will "defect" from the portrait of America displayed in
the public classroom. Drawing upon the language of economics and the "prisoner's dilemma," van Geel portrays defectors
as seeking to avoid being a "prisoner's dilemma sucker." In
other words, the defectors will "free ride" on the virtue and
patriotic sacrifice of others while being taught, for example,
"to question the promises of politicians and the demands of
government."6
Two present features of American law work against such
defection and facilitate the path to critical inquiry: the constitutional recognition of a parental right to control the upbringing of their children7 and at least limited judicial recognition of academic freedom in the public classroom. Because
van Geel perceives the parental right recognized in the 1920s
to be contrary to interpretist methods of constitutional construction and because he finds no clear constitutional recognition of a teacher's right to academic freedom, the task he
sets out to perform is to strengthen both of these legal supports for introducing independent, evaluative thought of the
American experience into the classroom. Employing a
5.
6.
7.

van Geel, at 318.
Id. at 344.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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noninterpretist method, he finds that both rights are morally
anchored, and from this, he argues for their more secure
constitutional recognition.
The late Justice Frankfurter once wrote that "[o]ur constant preoccupation with the constitutionality of legislation
rather than with its wisdom tends to preoccupation of the
American mind with a false value." 8 In this sense, a reader
can question Professor van Geel's preoccupation or struggle
to locate the values he finds normatively significant in a document which was not intended as the oracle of moral wisdom,
but as a reasonably straightforward plan of governance.
Putting this objection to one side and admitting to be intrigued by van Geel's analysis, I cannot help but wonder
whether a strawman has been erected and then vanquished.
The skepticism that present students bring to political and
economic questions suggests that there is far less pure inculcation going on in the public school classroom than meets
van Geel's eye. In part, this may be attributable to the continued vibrancy of private school alternatives, but its generality
suggests that the run of public school teachers are also doing
more than introducing students to storybook images of their
country. Whatever the stimulus for the existence of evaluative thinking among the present student population, its existence suggests that van Geel may have taken us through the
woods and back again to justify that which is already being
done. Of course, such intellectual touring is not altogether
bad, since there is value in recognizing those elements of the
educational status quo which have merit, if for no other reason, to resist pleas to fix them when they aren't broken.
Then again, van Geel may mean more than this. He
states at the outset that his use of the term "subversive" is
not metaphorical. In that light, he anticipates the objection
that what he is really seeking is the transformation of the
Constitution into a "suicide pact." Van Geel spends little
time answering the concern over the preservation of the social fabric, arguing instead that "the government has ample
constitutional means to protect itself."9 Yet, the difficult
question is how far can this be pressed? If the pursuit of subversive teaching greatly aggravates social disharmony and racial and religious tension, at what point does the wisdom of
this subversion in the classroom come to be questioned?
8. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
670 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting) (1943).
9. van Geel at 303.
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True, society may have means to protect itself, but many may
think that sacrificing the pursuit of common ideals and aspirations as a matter of educational policy forfeits the most rational means of doing so.
The article by well-known sociologist Dr. James S. Coleman10 builds on his earlier empirical work which found
higher verbal and mathematical achievement and lower dropout rates in Catholic high schools, than in either public
schools or nonsectarian private schools. Coleman relates
these differences to the existence of "social capital" in Catholic schools: that is, the network of relationships among
teacher, student and parent. Because of shared religious values and objectives, this relationship is often richer than the
occasional parent-teacher conference. Social capital is distinguished from the physical capital of school books and science
labs or the human capital of the skills and capabilities of
teachers and parents. The importance of social capital is
found to be especially great for those with less access to physical and human capital. Moreover, Coleman writes, "[tlhe social capital in the religious community surrounding the
school appears especially effective for those
children lacking
'
11
strong social capital within the family."
The importance of the social capital of Catholic schools
has grown as the social capital of the family has waned. As
Coleman points out, "'[m]odern family deficiencies' are
growing rather rapidly, as seen in the declining presence of
both father and mother in the household, through work in
settings outside, and organizationally distant from, the household."1 2 Several policy implications flow from this not the
least of which is the observation that expenditures on increased physical and human capital, while helpful, may be far
less important to educational performance than efforts at
strengthening the family and the willingness of family members to interact with each other.
Because "social capital does not arise automatically,''1 8
Coleman suggests that it is important to consider whether existing legal arrangements act as an incentive or disincentive
to its creation. In this regard, Coleman argues: "[t]he establishment clause and constitutional provision for the separa10. Coleman, The Creation and Destruction of Social Capital: Implications for the Law, 3 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETmICS & PUB. POL'Y. 375 (1988).

11. Id. at 382.
12. Id. at 390.
13. Id. at 393.
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tion of church and state, particularly as interpreted by the
courts, has inhibited the employment of that social capital
[which flows from a religious community] toward the education of the young. .. 14 Similarly, the rise of the modern corporate state has drawn attention away from the family, suggesting that "adult family members have less reason to invest
resources in their children and more reason to invest those
resources in satisfying their own individual interests."1 Overall, Coleman further posits that "[t]here are other adjustments which reduce the incidence or strength of the parental
role (and thus reduce the social capital available to children),
including increasing numbers of married couples deciding
not to become parents, and the increased use of day care and
after-school facilities to accommodate single parents and
working parents."'"
It is interesting to assess Coleman's writing in light of the
intensified calls for federally financed child care. 7 This is
often portrayed as "pro-family," although Coleman's research would suggest that the description is more Orwellian
than true. It is perhaps for this reason that he is pessimistic
about the prospects for old forms of family and community
being revived. Instead, he speculates that since the adult
members of the family have been siphoned off into the corporate state, the law should arrange for children to follow,
such that firms above a given size would have to approximate
the age distribution of society. The suggestion, of course, is a
radical one. Yet, it has a strange attractiveness, if only because we know Coleman is all too right in his portrayal of the
decline of the family. There is also a certain horror in thinking that the warehousing of children in child care might
some day become the only alternative.
In some ways, the article by Law Dean Bruce Hafen elaborates on Coleman's concept of social capital by stressing the
significant "mediating" role both public and private schools
occupy between the individual and the state.'8 Mediating institutions help supply meaning and identity in life, and generally, insulate an individual from direct governmental or organizational control. Like van Geel, Dean Hafen recognizes
14. Id. at 395.
15. Id. at 396.
16. Id. at 402.
17. See Safire, Sleeper Issue for the '88 Campaign: Child Care, New York
Times, p. 23 (April 25, 1988).
18. Hafen, Institutional Autonomy in Public, Private, and Church-Related
Schools, 3 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 405 (1988).
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that the kinship and shared devotion within a mediating
structure also can be a source of resistance to state-inspired
directives. In this regard, authoritarian or totalitarian control
is often inversely proportional to the strength of mediating
institutions. Hafen and van Geel part company, however, on
the importance of institutional, as opposed to individual, subversiveness. Thus, Dean Hafen is critical of first amendment
analysis which views academic freedom concerns solely in
terms of the individual. He is cheered by recent Supreme
Court decisions which reinforce a school's institutional judgment with respect to the content of student newspapers19 and
speech in student assemblies.'
Hafen sees other individual and state pressures lessening
the influence of mediating institutions "adversely affect[ing]
[a school's] capacity to educate their students.' ' 2 1 He is particularly concerned with the "enforced conformity" which results from "federal policies that can threaten the unique educational mission of a private school." 2 2 In this regard, he is
vexed by Congress' recent overruling of both the Supreme
Court and a presidential veto of the previous "program-specific" limitations in Title IX. His concern stems not only
from the increased sweep of federal regulation, but also the
preclusion of a religious school from "exclud[ing] students involved in extramarital sex" or "counseling students about
conflicts between marriage and career choices in ways that
affirm role distinctions in family life based on gender.""'
Like Coleman, Hafen's analysis is disquieting. Nevertheless, his presentation does reveal several indications of
greater intellectual, and, on occasion, legal, recognition of
the place of mediating structures in our society. While primarily concerned about the role of private schools, he refuses
to be drawn into the public/private squabble, recognizing
that "schools of both kinds are entitled to their own forms of
First Amendment protection. They need increased institutional strength, not only to encourage a stronger private educational sector, but to encourage greater educational quality
throughout the American system of education."' 4

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District, 108 S.Ct. 562 (1988).
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 562 (1988).
Hafen, supra note 18, at 405.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 417.

24.

Id. at 423.

19881

VALUES IN EDUCATION

This issue also contains three student comments, which
focus on three manifestations of the larger dilemmas posed
by our contributing scholars. Gene Assaf questions whether
the Court has a consistent view of the autonomy or maturity
of adolescent students.2 5 The occasion for doing so is the invalidation on establishment clause grounds of a federal district court law aimed at teaching sexual responsibility and reducing teenage pregnancy. While the Supreme Court has
since found the law to be facially valid, 2' Assaf claims that the
Court has employed a double standard: finding adolescents to
be impressionable and subject to indoctrination when the objective is the exclusion of religious influence and sufficiently
mature and capable of life and death decisionmaking when
the objective is the unfettering of access to abortion.
Martha Michael examines an appellate decision which
declined to accommodate the free exercise claims of parents
and students who objected on religious grounds to being exposed to a reading series designed to stimulate critical thinking." Michael concludes that none of the court's three separate opinions fully coincides with recent Court precedent
extending free exercise protection beyond belief to religiously-motivated conduct.
Finally, Gregory Evans confronts the ultimate breakdown in school authority: the dramatic and tragic increase in
school violence."" Evans suggests expanding school tort liability to include periods where his research has indicated violence is most likely to occur. As well-intentioned as his commentary surely is, it reveals most forcefully the limits of the
law. Perhaps, a change in the legal standard of care can "encourage socially desirable behavior." 29 Perhaps not. Either
way, as Evans recognizes, and as the articles in this issue
demonstrate, the problems go much deeper. Tougher laws
and increased financial resources whether for books or security patrols are awfully poor substitutes for the enduring love
and genuine interest of one's family.
25. Assaf, Autonomous Adolescents, Sexual Responsibility, Religious Organizations, and Congress: An Illicit Church/State Relationship in Kendrick v.
Bowen, 3 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 425 (1988).
26. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
27. Michael, Free Exercise of Religion Within The Public Schools? Mozert
v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 3 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PuB.
POL'Y 469 (1988).
28. Evans, School Crime and Violence: Achieving Deterrence Through Tort
Law, 3 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 501 (1988).
29. Id. at 507.

